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Abstract- The main purpose of the study is to assess the extent to which the Iraqi Supreme audit institution (SAI) 
independence in the context of legal and constitutional frame after 2003. This paper discusses and analyzes the implications 
of the nature of this independence on accountability in the Iraq public sector. Based on the reviews, criticisms and theoretical 
and legal analysis,the study confirms that the SAI independence is an important concept for any country, particularly 
democracy ones. The study finds that despite the independence of the Iraqi Supreme Audit Institution is considered as one of 
the basic issues that were included in the legal and constitutional frame in the post - Saddam Era, nevertheless the 
application of these texts were accompanied by many constraints and challenges which have contributed to the loss of the 
independence content, and then influenced on the Iraqi SAI performance in enhancing accountability and detect corruption 
in the public sector. 
 




It is widely accepted that the Supreme audit 
institutions (SAIs) are national-level watchdog 
agencies responsible for the audit of government 
revenue and expenditure (Nagy, 2012). The main 
objectives ofSAIsare usually involving to promote the 
proper and effective use of public funds; the 
development of sound financial management; the 
proper execution of administrative activities; and the 
communication of information to public authorities 
and the general public through the publication of 
objective reports(Borge, 2001). In addition, many 
countries nowadays have resorted to strengthen the 
role of SAIs in order to ensure the success of any plan 
to combat corruption in the public sector (Evans, 
2008). 
 
However, the SAIs role inensure transparency, 
accountability and fighting corruption in the public 
sector, should be synchronized with a set of 
principles that would enhance its role. The 
independence of supreme audit institutions is one of 
the basic principles which should underlie the 
functioning of these institutions (Dye, &Stapenhurst, 
1998). This principle indicates that the SAIs should 
not be subject to the influence of public authorities, in 
particular the executive authority which exercises 
most of the administrative and financial activities 
within the state. As well, the staffs of the supreme 
audit institutions should do their work on an 
independently of the influence of persons or 
institutions that subject to control (Wynne, 2010: 
57).In this regard, International Organization of 
Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) has produced 
two essential documents which define what is meant 
by SAIs independent. The first, agreed in 1977 and 
known as the “Lima Declaration”determines the 
principle of independence of government auditing. 
The second known as the “Mexico Declaration” 
which was agreed in 2007 and defines these 
requirements in more concrete terms identifying eight 
pillars underpinning the independence of SAIs.1 
Given the importance of these two documents, the 
United Nations has also adopted a resolution 
confirming the importance of ensuring the 
independence of SAIs. On 22 December 2011 the 
66th United Nations General Assembly adopted the 
Resolution "Promoting the efficiency, accountability, 
effectiveness and transparency of public 
administration by strengthening the independence of 
supreme audit institutions (UN Resolution A/66/209). 
 
In the Iraqi context, the independence of the Iraqi 
Supreme Audit Institution is considered as one of the 
basic issues that were included in the legal and 
constitutional frame after 2003. The change in the 
political system after the Saddam Hussain era led to a 
change in the features of building the constitutional 
institutions, including the Supreme Audit Institution 
(Jawad, 2013). In fact, adopting a parliamentary 
system, democratic ideas and the principle of 
separation of powers are all factors contributed to 
having, at least, a clear item in the law and 
constitution that assures the independence of the Iraqi 
SAI. However, there is a need to assess the extent of 
the application of the Iraqi SAI independence and its 
impact on its performance in the protection of public 
funds and the detect corruption in the public sector. 
This is because that Iraq after 2003 is witnessing a 
weakness in financial management, waste of public 
resources and public funds as well as, the spread of 
corruption in all government institutions without 
                                                             
1INTOSAI. The Lima and Mexico Declarations of the 
Independence of SAIs. For more information, visit 
http://www.intosai.org/issai-executive-summaries. 
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exception(Tas,2012: 462). To achieve the 
requirements of assessing the Iraqi SAI 
independence, thisstudy adopted a qualitative 
approach, and based on a single embedded case study 
approach involving multiple methods of data 
collection including public documents, semi- 
structured interviews. This methodology is chosen 
because the issues arising in this research are legally 
rooted and will be best resolved by reviews, 
criticisms and theoretical analysis and the application 
of statutes, instruments, conventions, treatiesand 
practices that established the legal principles of the 
SAI’s independence. 
 
II. KEY FEATURES OF THE SAIS 
INDEPENDENCE 
 
There is no doubt that the importance of the 
independence of the SAIs and its association with the 
principles of democracy and the rule of law, should 
be embodied through the presence of clear legal 
framework ensures this independence. Hence, the 
main features of the SAIs independence have 
identified through three basic legal elements. These 
elements are:  
 
First: the organizational independence, which refers 
to that the establishment of SAIs and the necessary 
degree of their independence should be stipulated 
down in the constitution; details may be set out in 
legislation. Other words, Organizational 
independence has to do with the formal position of 
the SAI within the organizational framework and the 
institutional arrangements in place to insulate it from 
outside influence. As such, it deals with issues 
relating to the constitutional/statutory guarantees of 
independence in relation to the legislative and 
executive branches of government (INTOSAI, Lima 
Declaration).This matter involves on two important 
points: the first relating to that constitution or the law 
should be explicitly specifying subordination of SAIs 
for public authorities in the state. In this regard, due 
of the executive branch's activities are targeted in the 
control, the SAI's subordinate should be associated to 
parliament or the judiciary.  If the executive branch of 
government were in a position to exercise 
unrestrained influence over an SAI, especially upon 
its management and governing body, this would be 
equivalent to the government’s primacy over the 
SAI(Gendron, & Cooper and Townley, 2001). 
Second point relates to the need to ensure the 
independence of the president and members of the 
Supreme Audit Institutions. According to the Lima 
Declaration that the independence not only of the 
SAIs themselves, but also of their members, stating 
that the independence of SAIs is inseparably linked to 
the independence of their members. In the 
Declaration, “members” are defined as those persons 
who have to make the decisions for the SAI and are 
answerable for these decisions regarding the exercise 
of the task of oversight of government activities. The 
independence of SAI's heads and members, should be 
included security of tenure and legal immunity in the 
normal discharge of their duties (INTOSAI, Lima 
Declaration). 
 
The demand for independence the head of SAI should 
also be accompanied of the SAI’s exclusive 
sovereignty in matters of human resources, including 
the appointment of staff. The Lima Declaration 
rightly assumes that the independence of an SAI’s 
staff guarantees the independence of the SAI as a 
whole. If the government or any other audited body 
were in a position to give instructions to SAI 
members or influence them in any other way, this 
would diminish the authority of the SAI, impair its 
impartiality, cast doubts upon the objectivity of its 
oversight tasks, and undermine the independence of 
the entire SAI, regardless of the existence of a legal 
or even a constitutional commitment to SAI 
independence (Van Zyl&Ramkumar, 2009).Thus, any 
government involvement in such matters would be 
equivalent to its indirectly influencing the oversight 
activity of the SAIs in strengthen the accountability 
of the government and fighting corruption. To 
achieve this end, the appointments promotions and 
the dismissals of auditors and, above all, disciplinary 
measures taken against them must therefore be 
beyond the influence of the executive branch of 
government(Kayrak, 2008: 63). 
 
Secondly: ensuring the financial independence of the 
SAIs, which is indicates that the SAIs should have 
sufficient financial resources to enable them to fulfill 
its tasks efficiently without any influence by the 
executive. To meet the requirements of this 
independence, Lima Declaration indicates that SAIs 
financial independence should be clearly reflected by 
specifying the funds earmarked for them in the public 
budget under a special budget heading separate from 
those of state ministries. Moreover, it is necessary to 
focus that the SAI be entitled to use its allotted funds 
as it sees fit and to implement its budget without 
having to obtain the approval of the executive powers 
of the government (INTOSAI, Lima 
Declaration).Hence, to ensure high-quality work, 
SAIs need well-qualified, adequately remunerated 
staff who are encouraged to continuously improve, 
especially in their areas of expertise. For example, 
auditors could enhance their skills in fraud detection 
and information technology through a combination of 
training, education, and experience. This requires, 
that the Supreme Audit Institutions through its 
president (or Auditor General) should be empowered 
to prepare and organization an independent budget 
submitted to the legislature directly without 
interfering executive power to modify its content( 
Hegarty&Musonda, 2010). Accordingly, it is possible 
to note that the need for a legal guarantee financial 
independence of the SAIs is due to the reason that the 
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executive branch in most countries are preparing a 
draft public budget, the possibility of the government 
earmarking a very small amount for the SAI in a 
conscious effort to restrict its scope of action cannot 
be altogether excluded. Therefore, the legislature or 
one of its commissions should be responsible for 
ensuring that SAIs have the proper resources to fulfill 
their mandate(Dye, &Stapenhurst, 1998).  
 
Thirdly,ensuring the functional independence, which 
is no less important for the objective and effective 
performance of the SAIs tasks in ensuring public 
sector accountability. For such independence to be 
guaranteed, the SAI’s oversight powers should be 
embodied in the constitution. Functional 
independence indicates that the SAIs should have the 
authority to access to all records and documents 
relating to financial management and administrative 
activities for all public sector institutions without 
exception (INTOSAI, Declarations of Lima 
&Mexico).In addition, the mandate of the SAIs 
regarding the implementation of the functions of 
control and audit must not be constrained by 
restrictions imposed from the executive branch. 
Within the legal framework governing its functions, 
the SAI must be free to set its own auditing priorities 
and apply the auditing methods and techniques it 
considers appropriate without being influenced by the 
government powers. Also, the SAI must enjoy 
complete freedom regarding the substance of its 
reports. Any attempt on the part of the government to 
influence the content of SAI reports or to suppress 
unfavorable audit results must be counteracted with 
determination in all circumstances (English, & 
Guthrie, 2000). 
 
Ultimately, it is possible to note that the achieving the 
independence of the SAIs’s reports requires 
submission of these reports to parliament or one of its 
commissions. This procedure will ensure the 
existence of effective follow-up mechanisms on SAI 
recommendations through the use of parliament 
powers to discuss the government's activities. 
Additionally, the publication of SAIs's reports, and 
make them available to the public, the media and civil 
society organizations, all contribute to strengthening 
the mechanisms of monitoring the implementation of 
those reports(Wang, &Rakner, 2005: 19).  
 
III. LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
REGULATION OF THE IRAQI SUPREME 
AUDIT INSTITUTION INDEPENDENCE 
 
To begin with, one of the important features that the 
Iraqi legislations have witnessed after 2003 is the 
inclusion the principle of the SAI independence 
within the legal and constitutional texts. By contrast, 
during the Saddam Hussain Era, despite that the SAI 
law of 1968 stipulated of its independence, however, 
such independence denied by the provisions of the 
Iraqi Repealed Constitution of 1970, when had 
clearly stated that the SAI is linked with the President 
of the Republic and the Council of the Revolutionary 
Command (RCC), which is also under the control of 
the president (Iraq’s interim constitution of 1970).  
 
Indeed, nature of the political system at that time was 
a presidential system. All legislative and executive 
authorities, even the judicial authority were all in the 
hand of the president through the RCC which is 
represented by Al-Baath Party. Al-Baath Party was 
the only party in power and the president was the 
supreme leader of the party, and has domination over 
all authorities. Thus, the independence of the 
Supreme Audit Institution was meaningless, 
especially with the absence of the political 
competition and political parties participating in 
authority. For this reason, the Supreme Audit 
Institution was categorized as part of the executive 
authority under the title of governmental institution 
that is not linked to a ministry (Al-Jeddah, 1998: 45). 
However, the political developments after 2003 
resulted in radical change in the structure of the 
constitutional institutions. The Iraqi constitution of 
2005has stated clearly the legal mechanisms for the 
formation of the constitutional institutions (e.g. 
legislative, executive and judicial authorities). In 
addition, it has declared the creation of a group of 
independent Institutions, with emphasis on the 
independence of the Iraqi SAI. For example, Chapter 
IV of Part III of the Constitution came under the title 
‘Independent Commissions’ and it included the 
following: 
 
‘‘The High Commission for Human Rights, the 
Independent Electoral Commission, and the 
Commission on Public Integrity are considered 
independent commissions subject to monitoring by 
the Council of Representatives, and their functions 
shall be regulated by law’ (Constitution of the 
Republic of Iraq, 2005: Article 102). Also, Article 
103 stipulated ‘First: The Central Bank of Iraq, the 
Supreme Audit Institution, the Communication and 
Media Commission are financially and 
administratively independent institutions, and the 
work of each of these institutions shall be regulated 
by law’. ‘Second: The Central Bank of Iraq is 
responsible before the Council of Representatives. 
The Supreme Audit Institution and the 
Communication and Media Commission shall be 
attached to the Council of Representatives’. 
 
On the other hand, in line with the constitutional text, 
SAI law No 31 of 2011, included that the Iraqi SAI 
‘‘… shall be a financially and administratively 
independent body with a judicial personality. It is the 
highest financial controlling body, which is attached 
to the Council of Representatives and represented by 
president of the institution or whom he may 
authorize’’ (Article 5 of the Iraqi SAI 
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Law).Accordingly, it can be noted that the above 
texts have clearly illustrated two important issues 
which are: First the Iraqi constitution has created 
independent organizations that did not exist before 
2003. Second, it has emphasized the independence of 
the Supreme Audit Institution as a constitutional 
institution that assists the Iraqi Council of 
Representatives for the purpose of enhancing the 
accountability and questioning on the works of the 
government.  
 
In this regard,the independence of institutions which 
have mentioned by the Iraqi constitution (e.g. the 
Supreme Audit Institution, the Integrity Commission, 
Commission of the Iraqi media, Commission of 
Human Rights, etc.) came as a necessity for the 
exercise of oversight functions by these bodies 
efficiently and objectively. Independent institutions 
are usually indicating a development in the concept of 
the work of oversight institutions on the activities of 
the public sector in states. The current development 
in the tasks of the state requires creation of 
specialized institutions that work on enhancing 
observation on the governmental activities for the 
purpose of protecting the principles of legality, the 
rule of law and the protection of citizens' rights. This 
perfectly applies to the independence of the Iraqi SAI 
which is considered an institution doing its task in 
observation on corruption and in the protection of 
public funds within a frame of cooperation with the 
Council of Representatives which seeks the same 
goal. Thus, the independence of the Iraqi SAI is ruled 
by the parliamentary system that currently exists 
according to the Iraqi constitution. Where, all the 
powers of the executive branch in setting public 
policy, public sector management, implementation of 
laws, and provision of basic services to citizens 
should be subject to the oversight of Parliament as a 
representative of the people. Therefore, for the 
legislative authority to be able to perform its 
supervisory task, it seeks support from the SAI as a 
neutral and independent institution (Zugheir, 
interview, 2015). 
 
With respect to the relationship between the Iraqi SAI 
and parliament, the Article (28) of the Iraqi SAI of 
2011 stipulates that ‘‘Within 120 days of the end of 
every year, the SAI through council of financial 
Audit shall present to the CoR an annual report of the 
basic aspects ensuing from the implementation results 
of the Board's annual plan, including the insights, 
observations and suggestions relevant to the financial, 
administrative, economic and legal circumstances. 
The report shall contain also evaluation of the 
efficiency and adequacy of the government 
procedures required to ensure effective and 
transparent collection of revenues and spending of 
public funds. Moreover, the Council may forward a 
report to the CoR on every important matter relating 
to the audit and evaluation of financial, administrative 
and economic performance, and may disseminate, by 
consent of the CoR, any issue it deems necessary’’ 
(Iraqi SAI of 2011). Accordingly, it can be noticed 
that these reports help the legislative authority to 
view the real picture in which public funds of the 
state are administered and to identify cases of 
cheating and corruption. For the CoR to benefit from 
these reports, it sends them to the Integrity 
Committee and the financial committee in the 
parliament according to the procedures indicated in 
the work stipulated contexts in the internal rules of 
procedures of the CoR. These committees are 
specialized in following up on cases of administrative 
and financial corruption identified in these reports in 
the different institutions of the state. The Financial 
Committee is also specialized in following up on the 
affairs of the general state budget and the transfers 
among its exits and reviewing the financial policy of 
the different ministries and institutions in the state 
(Moussa, Interview, 2015).  
 
Last but not least, the experience of democratic 
countries seems more obvious in strengthening the 
relationship between the SAI and parliamentary 
committees through the auditing reports. An example 
of this, most of commonwealth countries (e.g. UK, 
Australia, Canada, etc.), the auditor general is an 
essential element of parliamentary oversight. It 
reports directly to parliament and a specialized 
committee in parliament such as the Public Accounts 
Committee. This committee reviews audit findings, 
considers testimony by witnesses from government 
departments and sends its report to the full parliament 
(Dye, &Stapenhurst, 1998) and(Kellner, 2000: 172). 
From the above mentioned, it can be understood that 
the constitutional and legal indication of the 
independence of the Supreme Audit Institution does 
not refer to the establishment of a new institution 
different from the one that existed during the Saddam 
Hussain Regime. However, the existence of a 
constitutional frame for the independence of the  
Supreme Audit Institution in Iraq after 2003 has come 
to enhance the role of this institution in observation 
over the activities of the public sector being one of 
the main pillars in fighting corruption and in being a 
neutral institution that can contribute to the 
identification, detection and addressing of corruption 
in response to the constitutional development in the 
management of the institutions of the state and the 
relationship between the legislative and the executive 
authorities. 
 
IV. ASSESSMENT THECHALLENGES AND 
ISSUES RELATED TO THE INDEPENDENCE 
OF THE IRAQI SAI 
 
As previously noted that the constitutional and legal 
texts on independence of the Iraqi SAI is considered 
as a significant feature of Iraqi legislation after 2003. 
However, the application of the content of 
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independence was associated with several constraints 
and legal problems that have contributed to loss of 
the real meaning of independence. These constraints 
and obstacles are discussed and analyzed below. 
 
4.1. Obstructing the application of legal texts of 
independence by the executive branch 
Although the principles contained in the Iraqi 
constitution of 2005, refer to that this oversight 
institution must be exercised its functions without 
interference from the executive branch, and this 
institution should be associated with the legislative 
branch, the application of these principles have not 
materialized in practice. During the rule of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the Iraqi SAI 
remained subject to the instructions and 
recommendations of the US civil governor (Paul 
Bremer)2, and the Iraqi transitional government. This 
power has granted to the CPA according to the SAI's 
order of 2004, despite of the contradictory with other 
texts that prevent any interference in the SAI's tasks 
(The CPA Order No 71 of 2004). In this regard, 
during this period the CPA prevented the SAI of 
exercise its oversight functions only after obtaining a 
permit and approval of them. For example, audit the 
documents relating to the spending of Iraqi funds by 
the CPA were not available to the Supreme Audit 
Institution. The CPA was spending from the 
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) that includes the 
Iraqi funds that were frozen during Saddam's regime. 
More than $ 60 million spent during the years (2004-
2006) by granting construction contracts and provide 
aid to Iraqi ministries, but without providing any 
documents about the amount of such funds to the 
SAI. Thus, the independence of the Supreme Audit 
Institution in Iraq has not respected as prescribed by 
law(Salman, Interview, 2015). 
 
On the other hand, in 2006, when the election of the 
Council of Representatives (COR) and the formation 
the Iraqi government according to the 2005 
Constitution, there is a dispute between the executive 
and the (COR) about the relationship of oversight 
institutions (e.g. the Supreme Audit Institution, 
Integrity Commission, Commission of Iraqi Media, 
etc.) with the constitutional authorities. The (COR) 
explained that the constitution is clear in identifying 
the subordination of both the Supreme Audit 
Institution, Integrity Commission and independent 
institutions to parliament. Therefore, these 
institutions should work with the parliamentary 
committees in order to enhance the control of the 
parliament on the performance of the executive 
authority. Nevertheless, the position of the Iraqi COR 
has objected by the Council of Ministers, who 
insisted that the independent oversight institutions, 
                                                             
2 Lewis Paul Bremer III (born September 30, 1941) is an American 
diplomat. He is best known for leading the occupational authority 
of Iraq following the 2003 invasion by the United States. For more 
visit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Bremer. 
including the Supreme Audit Institution, should be 
treated as a government institution.  
 
The Cabinet, by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki3 
demanded that the independent institutions including 
the SAI must be linked and subject to the supervision 
of the Council of Ministers, due they are considered 
an executive institution like the ministries and 
government institutions. In the meantime, the absence 
of a new law to regulate the SAI's tasks accordance 
with the constitution of 2005, and opposes the 
partisan interests of the Iraqi COR which 
accompanied by dominance of the Prime Minister's 
party '' Dawa Party''led to the political consensus in 
subjection to the will of the prime minister in control 
of the oversight institutions (Faraj, 2012: 35). 
 
In clarifying the main reason of the political 
consensus and subjection to the prime minister's will 
in control on the SAI and oversight institutions, it is 
noted that the weakness of the legal culture of the 
members of the of the Iraqi parliament led to give in 
to the demand of the Prime Minister even though 
violation of the legality principle and the rule of law. 
Failure to apply the constitutional provisions on the 
independence of the Iraqi SAI is a clear violation of 
the principle of the rule of law and to move away 
from application of so-called democracy in Iraq. 
Moreover, the giving priority to party interests in 
dealing with the law, reflected negatively on the 
performance of the Supreme Audit Institution in 
controlling the public sector institutions, because it is 
unacceptable logically that the SAI be as part of the 
executive arm of government (Moussa, Interview, 
2015). 
 
Based on the analysis of the aforementioned views, it 
is clear that the executive branch's position is built on 
a breach the application of legal texts in dealing with 
the Iraqi SAI's independence. Other factors have 
contributed to this situation, such as CPA Orders 
during their rule of Iraq, and the ambiguity of the 
legal texts that dealing with the concept of 
independence, as well as the weakness of the Iraqi 
COR's position to protect the independence of the 
Supreme Audit Institution.  
 
4.2.Absence the legal guarantees of the Iraqi SAI 
organizational independence  
The organizational independence of the SAIs must 
involve the need to ensure the independence of both 
the head of the supervisory institution and its 
employees from executive influence. However, such 
guarantees have not been applied on the Iraqi SAI. 
Ambiguities and breach the application of legal texts 
                                                             
3 Nouri Kamil Mohammed Hasan al-Maliki ; born 20 June 1950), is 
an Iraqi politician who was Prime Minister of Iraq from 2006 to 
2014. He is secretary-general of the Islamic Dawa Party and a Vice 
President of Iraq from 2014 to 2015. For more, visit 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nouri_al-Maliki. 
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relating to the SAI independence contributed to the 
absence of independence both the head of the Iraqi 
SAI and its staff. Despite the Iraqi constitution of 
2005 is an explicitly noted of subordination the SAI 
to the COR, simultaneously, constitution gave the 
parliament the power of accountable and interrogate 
the president of SAI (Article: 61, Constitution of the 
Republic of Iraq, 2005). As well, the SAI's law 
pointed that the SAI's president is independent and 
may not serve in the cabinet in any capacity (Iraqi 
SAI Law of 2011, Article: 5). However, the 
procedures for the appointment and dismissal of 
SAI's President have remained under domination of 
the executive power. The above provisions have not 
been applied in practice because of the insistence of 
the Prime Minister and the Supreme Court's 
interpretation, in addition to the contradiction 
between the legal texts itself which did not explain 
these procedures in detail. Since 2004 until now, the 
appointment of the head of the SAI and procedure of 
his dismissal are based on a decision of the Prime 
Minister with a semi-formal approval from the COR. 
According to the Article (22 / first) of the Iraqi SAI 
law of 2011 whichstipulates that '' Based on a 
proposal from the council of ministers, the COR shall 
approve in majority the appointment of the President 
of the SAI ''. 
 
Thus, the executive branch dominance on the 
procedures of appointment and dismissal the head of 
the Supreme Audit Institution is considered one of 
main problems that have faced the Iraqi SAI's 
functions in the protection of public funds and 
overcome the corruption. Where, the head of the Iraqi 
SAI has often received the instructions by the 
government as part of the executive, and this 
contrasts with the nature of his works as head of the 
highest oversight institution in Iraq. Moreover, this 
situation does not comply with the principle of 
neutrality in the control of public sector institutions, 
where, if government members who dislike the 
findings of SAI can easily get rid from its president, 
this would be inimical to his independence and the 
effectiveness of his reports. Thus, many guidelines 
were issued from the head of SAI in application of 
the Cabinet instructions, excluded certain of 
administrative and financial activities, specifically, 
certain of government contracts from the audit. This 
situation has contributed to reducing the effectiveness 
of the SAI's performance due the executive usually 
behave in public money, and most forms of 
corruption relating to the exercise of their activities 
(al-Jurani, Interview, 2015). 
 
With respect to the independence of the Iraqi SAI 
staff, ideally, it can be noted that the rules of 
procedure for the Iraqi SAI have stipulated that the 
selection of candidates for the oversight functions 
within the SAI should be based on the qualities of 
efficiency and specialization. Nevertheless, the SAI’s 
law does not provide any guarantees for this purpose, 
where the procedures of selection and appointment 
the Iraqi SAI's staff have not different from the 
mechanics of the appointment of government 
employees. According to the Article (37) of the Iraqi 
SAI law of 2011, the employees of the SAI shall be 
subject to provisions of the regulations in effect, 
except for any issue being provided for in this law 
(The Iraqi SAI Law of 2011). Therefore, the Iraqi 
SAI’s staff do not have any privileges or guarantees 
to make them immune from the influence of the 
executive branch, besides the absence of 
independence for the President of the Supreme Audit 
Institution was directly reflected on the staff's 
independence (Hameed, Interview, 2015). 
 
Based on the aforementioned data, it was observed 
that the absence of legal safeguards of the 
independence the head of the SAIand staff, 
considered among the main obstacles that has 
affected on the SAI's functions. Making the head of 
the Iraqi SAI as part of the government officials is 
contrary of his jurisdiction to monitor the government 
sector activities, and to achieve an effective and 
impartial supervision. Hence, it is necessary to amend 
the legal mechanisms for selecting the SAI's head and 
staff without interference from the executive branch. 
 
4.3. Weakness the financial independence of the 
Iraqi SAI 
Although the financial independence requires that the 
SAI has a power to prepare an independent budget 
and sent directly to the legislature for approval in the 
state budget without any interference from the 
executive branch, however, the Iraqi SAI law did not 
include confirmation of this principle. According to 
Article (21) of SAI law, stipulates that the SAI's 
council has the planning and validating the annual 
draft budget of the Board according to the State 
general directions and submitting it to the Ministry of 
Finance to integrate it with the state's public budget 
(The Iraqi SAI Law of 2011). 
 
It is understood from the above, that the preparation 
of SAI's budget is adopting the same mechanism that 
follow by government institutions. Where, this budget 
sends to the Ministry of Finance and then to the 
Council of Ministers (the executive branch), which 
has the power to amend or delete the financial 
allocations SAI's. Therefore, it is clear that this legal 
text contrasts with the principle of the Iraqi 
constitution in confirming financial independence 
which must be granted the SAI, as well as the 
principles of international declarations (e.g. 
Declaration of Lima and Mexico) of financial 
independence of the SAIs as have been discussed 
previously. Moreover, SAI is financially dependent 
on the ministry of finances, which often causes 
interference of the executive and undermines the 
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work of SAI as an independent institution (VanZyl, 
Ramkumar& De Renzio, 2009).  
 
The lack of adequate funding is one of the constraints 
that have affected the performance of the supreme 
audit institution in Iraq. Because the Supreme Audit 
Institution require sufficient funds to exercise its 
important tasks which incumbent upon it in the 
control of public sector institutions effectively. 
However, the Iraqi supreme audit institution often did 
not get what it needed from these money, due it 
restricted in spending money according to estimate by 
the Cabinet and ministry of finance from the public 
budget allocations. In addition, the financial 
privileges that granted to the SAI's - auditors - not 
commensurate with the value of the risks which 
facing them when exercising their functions relating 
in detect corruption. More than that, the Council of 
Ministers according to the law of public sector 
salaries have powers in reduced the amount of 
salaries and bonuses for all government workers 
including the SAI's staff, and this is already happened 
in 2015(Salman, Interview, 2015). 
 
As evident from the above data that financing the SAI 
is often relying on what provided by the executive 
branch through the Ministry of Finance, without 
being appropriate of actual requirements to this 
institution. Therefore, the lack of improve the staff 
experiences and purchase the necessary tools to 
exercise oversight functions, were one of main 
problems that has affected the Iraqi SAI tasks.  
 
4.4.Lack the legal guarantees of the Iraqi SAI 
functional independence  
With respect to functional independence of the Iraqi 
SAI, it is possible to note that Iraqi SAI law, ideally, 
has included the text on these principles. According 
to Article (8) of the Iraqi SAI, the entities shall be 
subject to the SAI jurisdiction are:First - The state 
institutions and departments, the public sector, or any 
other authority deals with the public funds in 
collection, disbursement, planning, funding, 
exchanging, trading, in-kind production or production 
of commodities or services.Second - Any other 
authority whose law or by-law stipulates it should be 
subject to the Board’s audit and control”. In addition, 
Article 13 stipulates that ''The SAI has the following 
powers:First; The right to access all the documents, 
transactions, orders and decisions related to audit and 
control, to conduct or supervise an at site stock count, 
and to obtain, as appropriate, from all the relevant 
administrative and technical levels all the 
clarifications, information and answers needed to 
carry out its mission.Second; Auditing the classified 
programs and expenditures that are related to the 
national security, and President of the Board may 
deputize whom he chooses to act on his behalf to 
carry out the relevant auditing and reporting.Third; 
Based on a decision by the Council of Financial 
Audit, conducting inspections on the grants, loans, 
facilities, preferences and investments and making 
sure they are dedicated to the purposes of provision’’ 
(Iraqi SAI law of 2011). 
 
Indeed, the confirmation of Iraqi SAI law on the 
principles of functional independence has 
accompanied absenceof the necessary guarantees for 
the application the content of this independence. 
According to the SAI's reports, there are many 
problems which recorded as a challenges faced this 
institution in the imposition of control on public 
sector institutions and access to documents and 
records of many government institutions. For 
example, the reluctance of many government 
institutions in cooperate with SAI’s auditors by 
provide documents and records relating to certain 
financial and administrative activities. In addition, the 
direct intervention by the Council of Ministers in 
restrict the SAI's functions by many decisions that 
contrary with the law and instructions(The Iraqi SAI 
reports, 2005-2014).One of the main reasons that 
contributed to this situation, is that the SAI does not 
have any legal means or powers to impose sanctions 
against uncooperative governmental institutions in 
order to compel it to provide the documents and 
information which necessary for exercise the 
oversight functions. In return, the Iraqi SAI are 
binding, in all cases, in resorting to the Council of 
Ministers against the uncooperative governmental 
institutions that are already part of the executive 
branch(Hameed, Interview, 2015). 
 
According to Article (12) of the SAI law '' …Second; 
In case an auditee abstains from making available the 
records and information necessary for auditing and 
control, the SAI, within 20 days, shall make a notice 
to the auditee and the inspector general office in the 
auditee to present these records and information and 
to clarify the reasons for abstention. Third; Should 
the Board find the reasons for abstention 
unjustifiable, it may inform the council of ministers 
to carry out an investigation and bind the abstainer to 
provide the required records and information ''. As 
well as, Article 17 of the SAI law stipulated that ''The 
SAI is bound to advice the council of ministers on 
any dispute with the entities under its audit and 
control to take action on the issue''(Iraqi SAI law of 
2011).Therefore, there is a contradiction between the 
provisions of the law that granting the functional 
independence to the SAI, and the violation of the 
content of this independence by giving the Council of 
Ministers a power to resolve disputes between the 
SAI and governmental institutions which are mainly 
part of the Council of Ministers. For example, the 
SAI's reporting have recorded continuously for the 
years (2006-2015) abstention of many governmental 
institutions and ministries from providing the SAI 
many documents relating to contracts, public 
procurement and administrative activities despite its 
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involving suspicions of corruption. Although the 
continuation of these violations of governmental 
institutions, and inform the Council of Ministers to 
resolve it, Cabinet has not taken any measures against 
these institutions (Juma’a, Interview, 2015).  
 
Despite the Iraqi SAI law specifying the duties and 
powers of the SAI, clearly stipulates that the SAI can 
require any documents which are relevant to 
transactions within the scope of SAI’s audit, to be 
sent to the COR, however, the SAI often faces 
difficulties in timely receipt of documents and 
information from the executive, thus impeding the 
SAI’s audit efforts. Often, the SAI is forced to report 
the absence of response from the executive in its 
audit findings. Therefore, the restrictions on freedom 
of access to information by the executive branch is 
considered one of most serious challenges facing the 
Iraqi SAI's tasks in strengthening the control over 
public sector institutions in order to fight corruption 
(al-Jurani,Interview, 2015). Thus, more than ten years 
the Iraqi SAI has witnessed the late release of audit 
reports, which should be delivered to the Iraqi 
parliament within 120 days of the end of every year 
in order to be discussed. For example, the SAI's 
reports for the years (2004- 2007) has not been 
completed and delivered to the COR until 2008, 
while reports of the years (2008 - 2010) was 
completed in 2010, and finally reports for the years 
(2011 - 2014) was completed in 2015(Faraj, 2012: 
39). 
 
On the other hand, the impact on the Iraqi SAI's 
performance has not only confined to delay of the 
reports, but also in the preparation and approval the 
final accounts of the executive branch. Where, from 
among the problems that faced the SAI is that the 
executive branch (Ministry of Finance) did not 
respond to what imposed by constitution of need to 
provide the final accounts for the end of each year to 
the SAI for auditing, and sent to the COR for 
discussion. For example, the final accounts for the 
years (2003 - 2011) have not sent to the SAI only in 
2012. Accordingly, throughout the years (2003 - 
2011) any closing of the final accounts has not been 
discussed, except for the final account report for the 
year 2004, which was discussed in 2008 (Faraj, 2012: 
45). 
 
Therefore, the delay in the provision the SAI's reports 
to parliament on time and the absence of discussion 
the governmental final accounts reports, is one of the 
illegalities that have contributed to reducing the role 
of the Iraqi SAI in strengthening financial 
management and accountability of the executive 
branch about the administrative and financial 
corruption cases.One of the consequences of such 
delays is impunity. For example, cases of corruption 
registered in the SAI's reports may not be taken into 
consideration when its delay in the issuance, as well 
as the discuss the final accounts that reveal the final 
results for the extent of governmental credibility in 
spend the public money without wastage or 
corruption(Salman, Interview, 2015). 
 
In the end, it is clear the absence of functional 
independence guarantees was among the main factors 
that have influenced on the Iraqi SAI's performance 
in strengthen the accountability of the executive 
branch through the annual reports to discuss the final 
account of the public sector institutions. The delay in 
preparation of the annual reports by the Iraqi SAI for 
many years, contributed the neglect of its discussed 
by the Integrity and Finance Committees of the Iraqi 
COR, despite the fact that these reports have recorded 





Based on the analysis the aforementioned of the legal 
texts and interviews it can be concluded that the 
principle of the SAI independence was one of the 
basic features that characterized the Iraqi legislation, 
whether in the Constitution of 2005 or the SAI laws 
after 2003.However, the application of the principles 
of the Iraqi SAI's independence did not appear in the 
field of practical application due of many obstacles 
and problems that accompanied of the Iraqi SAI 
tasks. Ambiguity of the constitutional and legal texts 
and the dominance of the executive branch as a result 
of the actions of the Prime Minister, all these factors 
had a negative impact on the absence of legal 
guarantees of the organizational, functional and 
financial independence of the Iraqi SAI. It is believed 
that all of these obstacles have contributed to weaken 
the functions of the SAI and the spread of corruption 
in Iraq. Therefore, this study suggests, that it is 
necessary to revise the constitutional and legal 
provisions relating to the Iraqi SAI independence. 
The removal of the contradiction between the legal 
texts, and granting legal guarantees to ensure the real 
independence of the SAI, will contribute to 
strengthening the Iraqi SAI performance to impose an 
effective control on government institutions as well, 
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